Domestic Ideas and Interests in Global Governance: Comparing German and U.S. Preference Formation by Schirm, Stefan
    
 
 
 
Mario Einaudi  
Center for  
International   
Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Ideas and Interests  
in Global Governance:  
Comparing German and U.S. 
Preference Formation  
 
Part Two of the Germany in Global 
Economic Governance Series 
 
 
 
Stefan A. Schirm 
May 2008 
 
 
 
 
M a r i o  E i n a u d i  C e n t e r  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s  •  w w w . e i n a u d i . c o r n e l l . e d u  
1 7 0  U r i s  H a l l ,  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  I t h a c a  N Y  1 4 8 5 3 ,  t .  6 0 7 - 2 5 5 - 6 3 7 0 ,  f . 6 0 7 - 2 5 4 - 5 0 0 0 
No.2-08 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T o  v i e w  p a s t  w o r k i n g  p a p e r s  a n d  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  s u b m i s s i o n ,  p l e a s e  v i s i t  
t h e  M a r i o  E i n a u d i  C e n t e r  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  S e r i e s  
w e b p a g e  a t :  h t t p : / / w w w . e i n a u d i . c o r n e l l . e d u / i n i t i a t i v e s / w o r k i n g . a s p .  
F o r  m o r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  p l e a s e  c o n t a c t  D r .  H e i k e  M i c h e l s e n ,  1 7 0  U r i s  H a l l ,  
T e l :  6 0 7 . 2 5 5 . 8 9 2 6 ,  h m 7 5 @ c o r n e l l . e d u .
 i
Domestic Ideas and Interests in Global Governance: 
Comparing German and U.S. Preference Formation 
 
By 
 
Stefan A. Schirm 
 
Abstract 
 
Financial crises underline the necessity for more effective governance of global markets. 
While the New Basel II Accord showed the possibility of multilaterally creating better 
governance, no agreement has been reached on the reform of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Why do governments agree on a reform of global financial governance in 
some cases, but not in others? I argue that convergence and divergence of governmental 
positions towards new governance cannot be explained solely by the logic of the 
international system nor by globalization, but instead strongly reflect domestic ideas and 
interests. In addition, I argue that variation in success in achieving new governance is 
shaped by the different impact of ideas versus interests on the ability of governments to 
compromise internationally. But when do ideas prevail over interests and vice versa? In 
this regard, I argue that ideas prevail when new governance initiatives affect lobby 
groups only diffusely and concern fundamental questions on the role of politics in 
governing the economy. Interests prevail when specific lobby groups are affected directly 
and when new governance initiatives try to administer the distribution of costs and gains 
sectorally. The arguments are tested in case studies on the preference formation of the 
U.S. and German governments on the reform of the IMF and on Basel II in 2001-2007. 
 
About the Author 
 
Stefan A. Schirm (Ph.D. and Habilitation from the University of Munich, 1994 and 
1998) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bochum (Germany) where he 
holds the Chair for International Relations. Previously he taught at the Universities of 
Munich and Stuttgart and was Research Associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, and John F. Kennedy Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University. Among other publications on IPE, Stefan A. Schirm is the author of 
Globalization and the New Regionalism (Cambridge: Polity Press 2002), Internationale 
Politische Ökonomie (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007), ‘The Power of Institutions and 
Norms in Shaping National Answers to Globalization’ (German Politics 11 (2002) 3), 
and the editor of Globalization. State of the Art and Perspectives (London: Routledge 
2007) and New Rules for Global Markets (New York: Palgrave 2004).  
 
Contact Information 
Professor Dr. Stefan A. Schirm, Chair for International Relations, Faculty for Social 
Sciences, Ruhr-University Bochum, GC 04/706, 44780 Bochum, Germany. E-Mail: 
stefan.schirm@rub.de, Homepage: www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/lsip.  
 ii
Preface 
This paper was presented during a conference on 'Germany in Global Economic 
Governance', which took place at Cornell University on Feb. 22/23, 2008. It was 
organized by Stefan Schirm (Ruhr University of Bochum) and Hubert Zimmermann 
(Cornell). We would like to thank our sponsors, the DAAD (German Academic 
Exchange Service), the Department of Government, the University of Bochum, the Mario 
Einaudi Center for International Studies, the Institute for European Studies as well as 
Peter Katzenstein (Cornell), who served as commentator. 
 
Germany, still the third or fourth largest global economy, has been particularly active in 
proposing a tighter regulation of international financial markets.  We use Germany as an 
exemplary case of how medium-sized countries can shape global governance and how the 
political economy of countries with coordinated market economies conditions their global 
governance strategies as compared to so-called liberal market economies, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  With this focus, the project permits and initiates 
an overdue dialogue between the literatures on varieties of capitalism and on global 
governance, using global governance as the dependent variable. Another objective of the 
workshop was to address the dearth of country-specific case studies in research on global 
governance which often treats all states as essentially similar in their reaction to 
economic globalization. 
 
Contributors were asked to look at various areas of global governance (such as hedge 
fund regulation, IMF reform, Basel II, pharmaceutical regulation, corporate governance, 
transgovernmental standard-setting, etc). All papers identified several levels shaping the 
German position: the subnational, the European and the global level. The German 
government, with varying success, engaged in strategic forum-shopping among these 
levels. A further characteristic was close cooperation between state and non-state actors. 
Overall, the extent of Germany's capacity to shape global governance is surprisingly 
large. 
  
 
1 
 
Domestic Ideas and Interests in Global Governance:  
Comparing German and U.S. Preference Formation 
 
 
Introduction1 
Economic globalization through cross-border financial flows is only partially matched by 
political globalization in the form of multilateral rules for global markets. Some instances 
witnessed the creation of new political initiatives such as the Basel II Accord and the 
Financial Stability Forum. At the same time, the political management of financial crises 
through a reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not improved 
substantially. The only partial globalization of politics can be considered a drawback, 
since globalization - defined as the growing share of cross-border economic activity in 
total economic output – has increased instability in the world economy. This became 
evident with the number and severity of financial crises, such as those in Latin America 
and Asia, in the 1990s as well as in the financial market turbulence in the industrialized 
world in 2007-08.  
 
These crises and conflicts are not restricted to individual countries, but increasingly affect 
all countries integrated into the world economy. Financial crises, for example, did not 
only damage directly involved emerging markets such as Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina, 
and Russia, but also industrialized countries in Europe and North America through a 
selective breakdown of trade, losses for creditor banks and stock exchange turmoils. 
Thus, not only are developing countries and emerging markets subject to crises induced 
by globalization, but the industrialized world is as well. Although globalization is not 
necessarily a homogenous force, the governments of those countries which are heavily 
integrated in the world economy share a common perception of the need for a better 
governance of globalization via more efficient multilateral rules for the prevention and 
management of financial crises. This common perception is acknowledged by the 
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Germany in Global Economic 
Governance” at Cornell University, February 22, 2008. I would like to thank Laura Carsten, Robert Kaiser, 
Peter J. Katzenstein, Andreas Nölke, and Hubert Zimmermann for valuable comments and Jost Wübbeke 
for research assistance.  
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governments of the most important actors in today’s international political economy. 
Even before the current financial market turbulence, key decision makers from the 
industrialized countries, including Germany and the U.S., stressed the need for better 
global economic governance, for example: 
 
• U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001) declared that: “(…) in our increasingly 
globalized world, America’s prosperity and well-being are linked ever more closely 
to expanding growth and stability worldwide. That is why strong United States 
leadership in the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO is so crucial to America’s 
future and the world’s future.” 
• The White House (2006) under President George W. Bush stressed in its National 
Security Strategy: “In our interconnected world, stable and open financial markets 
are an essential feature of a prosperous global economy. We will work to improve 
the stability and openness of markets by (…) strengthening international financial 
institutions”. 
• Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (2002) emphasized the necessity for a 
new political architecture of the world economy: “After all, we need a truly 
democratic trade and financial regime in the world.” 
• Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel (2007) declared at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos: “We politicians know these fears [of globalization] well and 
therefore have to do everything to shape globalization politically. (…) We want to 
minimize the systemic risks of international capital markets (…). We need a 
coherent, joint action in many international bodies.” 
 
This shared perception of the need for better global economic governance often does not 
translate into compatible positions on the form of desired new governance. Differing 
strategies for the design of new rules can be found even between industrialized countries 
of the G7. On the governance of financial markets, for example, one can observe 
diverging preferences between the American and German governments with regard to the 
reform of the IMF: while the United States prefers a restriction of IMF activities to 
emergencies, the German government wants to expand the Funds programs as well as its 
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governmental funding (Gamble 2004; Helleiner/Momani 2007; Schirm 2004). Thus, the 
core questions are: Why do governmental preferences on new rules for global markets 
diverge? Why do governments agree on a reform of global economic governance in some 
cases, but not in others?  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses core elements of research on 
global economic governance and delineates where the explanatory gap lies. In order to 
close this gap, I propose an analytical approach, which argues that national preferences 
on global economic governance strongly reflect domestic ideas and interests. In addition, 
I argue that variation in success in achieving new governance is shaped by the different 
impact of ideas versus interests on the ability of governments to compromise 
internationally. But when do ideas prevail over interests and vice versa? In this regard, I 
argue that ideas prevail when new governance initiatives affect lobby groups only 
diffusely and concern fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the 
economy. Interests prevail when specific lobby groups are affected directly and when 
new governance initiatives try to administer the distribution of costs and gains sectorally. 
These arguments are then briefly tested in sections three and four through case studies on 
the formation of the preferences of the governments of the United States and Germany on 
the reform of the IMF and on the Basel II Accord in 2001-2007. 
 
Analytical Framework 
Research on global economic governance has focused on the international system as the 
level of analysis and has investigated predominantly questions on the performance of 
international organizations, on intergovernmental negotiations, and on the legitimacy of 
actors (see e.g. Barnett/Duvall 2005; Bird 2003; Bradford/Linn 2007; Diehl 2005; 
Hall/Bierstecker 2002; Kahler/Lake 2003; O’Brian et.al 2000; Nunnenkamp 2003; 
Nye/Donahue 2000; Shaffer 2005; Scholte 2003). Most studies do not open the black box 
of the state by asking for endogenous, societal reasons for governmental positions. 
Instead, states are often taken as unitary actors (such as “the U.S.A.”, Higgott 2004: 11), 
without considering the heterogeneity of domestic politics in pluralistic democracies. 
National preferences are often derived from the international system, that is, from a 
  
 
4 
 
neorealist perspective on the international distribution of power or from an institutionalist 
perspective on the configuration of international rules and expectations. Regarding the 
methodology and the theoretical approach, many studies focus on institutionalism and 
regime theory (see e.g. Adler and Bernstein 2005; Onuf 2002).  
 
I argue that in order to understand the problems in achieving better global economic 
governance, more research has to be focused on the domestic sources of the sometimes 
converging and sometimes diverging preferences of national governments. Despite the 
growing importance of private actors in shaping global governance, national governments 
remain core actors in this process. Drezner (2003: 36) confirms the gap in research by 
stressing “the need to focus more clearly on the origins of great power preferences in the 
global economy. (…) what drives the preferences of relevant actors? How can we divine 
what governments want?” More research on the domestic sources of governmental 
preferences seems to be especially important because differences in governmental 
positions towards global governance are often an obstacle for improving the management 
of globalization.  
 
This paper intends to answer the questions outlined above with a societal approach to 
governmental preference formation, thus complementing the dominant focus in research 
on regime theory and institutionalism. Following the liberal theory of international 
relations, I will focus on the influence of domestic politics on governmental preferences 
on foreign (economic) policy and on the interaction between globalization and domestic 
politics (Frieden/Rogowski 1996; Moravcsik 1997; Putnam 1988; Schirm 2002a: 33-56, 
Weiss 2003). My core argument is that the diverging positions of governments towards 
global economic governance and the variation in their ability to compromise on 
multilateral economic agreements is strongly shaped by domestic ideas and interests. The 
argument is based on the assumption that governments in democratic political systems 
represent dominant societal influences which can range from specific lobby groups to the 
attitudes of voters. Thus, governmental positions express preferences originating from 
societal influences prior to international strategies and interstate negotiations. This 
implies, “that states do not automatically maximize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of 
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security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists tend to assume. 
Instead (…) they pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, 
and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups” (Moravcsik 1997: 519).  
 
In order to understand international behavior of states it is thus necessary to first analyse 
the domestic sources of governmental preferences. For this purpose, I suggest two 
explanatory variables: because governments want to be re-elected, they are responsive in 
democracies to the way in which both domestic material interests and value-based ideas 
relate to globalization and global governance. With these variables the paper addresses 
both the more recent material changes brought about by globalization as well as the 
longer term values of the societies affected by globalization. It differs from most other 
approaches by including two driving forces in the analysis which are usually employed 
exclusively. The inclusion of both variables is based on the assumption that individual as 
well as governmental preferences and actions can be influenced either by short-term 
material considerations or long-term ideas individually, or by a combination of both. 
Obviously, not only ideas and interests compete with each other in influencing 
preferences, but in pluralistic societies different interests and different ideas also compete 
amongst themselves. In addition, both can interact with each other in a non-competitive 
way. For example, dominant ideas can reinforce or weaken specific interests and 
changing interests can trigger a socialization process which can change ideas (on the 
interaction between ideas and interests see Goldstein/Keohane 1993; March/Olsen 1998; 
Thelen 1999: 379-381). The two variables shall be defined as follows: 
 
Interests are defined here as material economic considerations of domestic groups which 
can change rapidly according to changing circumstances, that is, according to new 
incentives and costs induced by globalization and (new) global governance. This 
definition is based on analyses concerning the interaction of economic 
internationalization with domestic sectors and politics, for example, by Jeffry Frieden and 
Ronald Rogowksi (1996) and Andrew Moravcsik (“commercial liberalism”, 1997). 
Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 35) argue that globalization, as “the exogenous easing of 
international exchange”, leads interest groups to pressure the government into 
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establishing competitive conditions. Moravcsik (1997: 528) emphasizes that changes in 
the structure of the domestic and global economy alter the costs and benefits of 
transnational exchange, creating pressure on governments to facilitate or block such 
exchanges. My own previous research (Schirm 2002a) confirmed this point in 
comparative country studies, revealing that, because of globalization private interests 
have increasingly positioned themselves along transnational economic considerations in 
influencing governmental preferences. Therefore, in this paper the suspected causal 
connection between interests and governmental preferences focuses on the material 
impact of globalization and/or (new) global economic governance in form of (expected) 
changes in (domestic) economic conditions. This focus seems plausible, because private 
interests are increasingly tied to the world market through the growing share of the 
transnational economy in a country’s national product. This connection can occur, for 
example, in the form of a company’s or a sector’s more positive attitude towards further 
globalization due to a successful competitive position on the world market. Likewise, 
increasing integration of national economies can trigger opposition towards further 
integration if jobs and profits are threatened by global competition or (new) global 
governance. In each case, lobbying groups such as employer associations and trade 
unions would articulate their interests vis-à-vis the government. Methodologically, it has 
to be empirically shown if and how the material interests of dominant actors towards 
globalization and global financial governance (liberalization, protectionism, standards 
etc.) are reflected in governmental positions and their ability to compromise. 
 
Ideas relevant for global economic governance preferences are defined here as path-
dependent and value-based collective expectations in a given society on how politics 
should govern the market. Ideas can express themselves in societal attitudes and, in an 
institutionalized form in the political culture and system of a country. Like interests, ideas 
can change, but changes take longer than changes in material interests due to the path-
dependent character of ideas. A value-based idea is relevant for the re-election of a 
government if it possesses high commonality (is it shared by a large number of citizens?) 
and specificity (is its meaning precise?) (Boeckle and Rittberger and Wagner, 2001: 109-
110). This conception of the variable “ideas” is based on my own previous research on 
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societal norms (Schirm 2002b, 2004, 2005) as well as on Moravcsiks “Ideational 
Liberalism” (1997). In further developing Moravcsik’s approach, I differentiate between 
process ideas and content ideas (Schirm 2004: 12). Ideas relating to political process are 
defined as dominant expectations about the way political decision making should be 
conducted and can favor, for example, the inclusion of all relevant societal groups in the 
form of the idea of “consensual decision making,” as is found in Germany, or stress 
“majoritarian and competitive decision making,” as found in the U.S. Ideas relating to the 
content of politics express what a society sees as a core task of the state in a given policy 
area. In the economic realm, competing content ideas can be, for example, “individual 
responsibility” and “trust in market forces” versus “public solidarity” and “regulating 
market forces.” As stated earlier, ideas and interests may interact by re-enforcing or 
weakening each other. For example, the intensity with which interests influence 
governmental positions may depend on the set of ideas on the related issue such as the 
idea of “individual responsibility” supporting the material interest in “liberalization.” 
Methodologically, it has to be empirically shown if and how endogenously dominant 
ideas are reflected in the preferences of the governments towards global financial 
governance and can thus explain the divergence or convergence in these preferences, as 
well as the varying ability of the governments to compromise. 
 
Summing up, the following three questions and hypotheses form the analytical 
framework and will guide the empirical research in the case studies:  
 
1. Why do governmental preferences agree on the necessity of global governance, but 
often disagree on its form? If endogenous ideas and/or interests differ between states, 
then diverging governmental preferences on global governance are to be expected 
despite a similar perception of the need for a better management of the world economy. 
Preferences towards global governance are the dependent variable, while endogenous 
ideas and interests constitute the independent variables. It has to be analyzed empirically 
how far the preferences correspond to endogenously dominant, and in cross-country 
comparison possibly diverging ideas and/or interests. With “interests” I refer to the costs 
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and incentives felt by a sector or company as a result of its competitive situation in world 
markets and/or within the scope of potential new governance rules. With “ideas” I refer to 
fundamental attitudes towards the role of politics in governing the economy. 
 
2. Why do governments agree on a reform of global financial governance in some cases, 
but not in others? If differences in material interests between countries dominate 
governmental preferences, then an agreement on new governance through compromise is 
more likely than in situations where differences in ideas dominate. The dependent 
variable is the agreement on new governance, while the dominance of interests over ideas 
in governmental preferences constitutes the independent variable. It has to be analyzed 
empirically, first, whether divergent material interests shaped the positions of 
governments in instances of successful negotiations on new governance and, second, if 
divergent ideas were dominant in instances of unsuccessful negotiations. Hypothesis II is 
more complex than Hypothesis I and seems plausible because different material interests 
can be settled in an international negotiation process more easily through calculating a 
mutually acceptable distribution of costs and benefits than can differences in value-based 
ideas. As the settlement of the latter requires consensus among the differing parties, it 
seems to be more difficult to achieve on the international stage than domestically because 
there is no international society which can come to a new consensus on ideas the way 
national societies can. Societies may be increasingly influenced transnationally, but they 
are still predominantly constituted nationally. Thus, ideational divergence can also be part 
of an international negotiation process but is less likely be settled by compromise than 
diverging interests due to the roots of divergence in path-dependent values of national 
societies.  
 
3. Under which conditions do ideas prevail over interests and under which conditions do 
interests prevail over ideas? When special interests are affected directly and distributive 
questions dominate, then interests will prevail over ideas in shaping governmental 
preferences. When interests are affected in a diffuse way and fundamental questions 
about the role of politics in governing the economy dominate the governance debate, then 
ideas will prevail over interests. The dependent variable here is the prevalence of either 
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ideas or interests and the independent variable is either “interests affected diffusely and 
fundamental governance questions dominate” or “special interests affected directly and 
distribution of costs dominate”. The hypothesis seems plausible because if special 
interests are directly affected with regard to costs, then the respective actors and their 
lobby groups have a strong incentive to influence the government. On the other hand, if 
interest groups are only affected in a diffuse way and fundamental questions on the 
political governance of markets dominate the governance debate, then basic societal 
attitudes will be more relevant while interest groups do not have the motivation for 
intense lobbying (Schirm 2007b: 314-316). Moravcsik (1997: 529) illustrates this point 
with regard to trade policy: “Recent research supports the view that protectionist pressure 
from rent-seeking groups is most intense precisely where distributional concerns of 
concentrated groups are strongest.” Thus, I argue that interests will prevail over ideas 
when (new) global governance initiatives directly affect organized interests with 
adjustment costs. If not, ideas will prevail over interests in shaping governmental 
preferences. 
 
The analytical framework developed here intends to complement other approaches and 
the explanatory variables ideas and interests should neither be seen as deterministic, nor 
as exclusive. Other factors than endogenous interests and ideas might, of course, also 
influence governmental preferences and their ability to compromise multilaterally. The 
argument here is that the focus on international institutions and regimes, on power, on the 
legitimacy of non-governmental actors and on globalization has to be analytically 
complemented by examining ideas and interests within national societies as foundations 
for governmental preferences and thus as a possible explanation for success and failure in 
achieving new forms of global economic governance. 
 
Operationalization of case studies  
In sections 3 and 4, I will briefly give evidence for the explanatory power of the 
hypotheses in case studies on the preferences of the German and the US governments on 
a reform of the IMF and on the Basel II Accord in the period 2001 to 2007. This period 
encompasses the debate and the negotiations for a reform of both governance institutions 
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starting in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis for the IMF and with the first proposals to 
substitute Basel I in the end of the 1990s. The two empirical cases IMF and Basel II were 
chosen in order to present a variation from successful (Basel II) to non-successful (IMF) 
cooperative situations. Keohane (2002: 252) underlines the relevancy of studying this 
variation: “[W]e can not understand why institutions vary so much in their degree of 
effectiveness simply by studying institutions. To focus only on existing institutions is to 
select on the dependent variable, giving us no variance and no leverage on our problem. 
On the contrary, we need to explore situations in which institutions have not been cre-
ated, despite a widespread belief that if such institutions were created, they would be 
beneficial”. The countries analyzed in both cases are key players: the US and Germany 
figure among those states with the largest voting quotas (within the IMF) and influence 
(Basel Committee) as well as open ambitions to reform both institutions. In analyzing the 
possible relevance of ideas for governmental positions, I will use speeches by heads of 
governments and top representatives of the responsible ministries (finance, economy, 
foreign affairs). In these speeches, I will search for evidence that shows whether or not 
the preferences differ along the fundamental ideas on policy contents and on political 
process relevant in the respective society. In examining the possible influence of 
interests, I will use speeches and press releases of (potentially) affected business 
associations as well as documents and speeches of the politicians and ministries in charge 
and analyze whether or not their positions correspond to the material interests of business 
groups.  
 
Exemplifying hypotheses via the statements of politicians can provide only plausibility, 
not proof. A public statement by the government underlining its positions with material 
interests or ideas does not necessarily provide the “real” reasoning behind the 
government’s preference. When governments underline their preferences with ideas, then 
they can, for example, also draw a rhetorical picture to promote hidden material agendas 
such as protectionism or market access. However, public statements give evidence for 
what the government considers acceptable to the voters and therefore legitimate. Thus, I 
assume that governmental preferences will in principle reflect attitudes grounded on 
“real” endogenous patterns of legitimate ideas and interests. In order to secure this link 
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between governmental preferences and societal ideas and interests, the empirical 
evidence on the dependent variable – governmental preferences - focuses on quotes of 
decision makers of the politically responsible ministries and of heads of government who, 
based on the standard assumption of self-interest to remain in office, will base their 
positions on patterns acceptable and thus legitimate in the eye of voters. Positions of 
experts are not considered because they do not ultimately decide and because they are not 
accountable to voters. The following quotes serve as an exemplary illustration of 
governmental positions. 
 
Domestic Ideas and Governmental Preferences: The Reform of the IMF 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created as part of the Bretton Woods system 
and aims at securing the stability of exchange rates and the international balance of 
payments. If a member country has problems with its balance of payments, it can ask the 
IMF for financial assistance, which the latter then provides under the condition that the 
borrower adjusts its economic policy in order to improve its balance of payments. After 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in the 1970s, the IMF played 
a crucial role in managing the debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, the financial 
crises in Asia in 1997/98, and in other emerging markets such as in Russia and Argentina 
in the last ten years. The IMF has been criticized for not preventing these crises and for 
mishandling their management for example in South Korea and in Argentina (Bird 2003; 
Blustein 2003; Meltzer Commission 2000). In addition, recently the IMF is facing a 
declinig demand for its loans because newly industrializing countries such as China, 
Brazil and Argentina built up huge currency reserves in order to protect themselves 
against financial market turmoils independently of the IMF. Also, since the end of the 
1990s the United States government has been advocating a reduction of the IMF’s 
programs and funds as a measure to focus the Fund on its core duty (surveillance of 
exchange rate) and to prevent it from providing a safety net (“moral hazard”) for financial 
market actors through huge lending in crises situations, thereby leading it to follow a 
more market-based approach (Helleiner/Momani 2007: 2-10; Kenen 2007; Schirm 2004). 
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The IMF has also been criticized for being an instrument of the foreign policy of its most 
influential member state, the U.S.A.. Indeed, studies confirm that the IMF over time did 
act in favor of the policy goals of the United States and its banks (Broz/Hawes 2006). 
Thus, it is puzzling that the U.S. government has been demanding a downsizing of the 
IMF’s activities and budget in the last decade because this might counteract the strategic 
interests of the U.S. as well as the material interests of its banking community. According 
to Broz and Hawes (2006: 374-376) major American international banks heavily lobbied 
Congress in the 1990s to increase the Fund’s spending ability in order to secure IMF bail-
outs as an insurance for their loans to developing and newly industrializing countries. 
Thus, a specific puzzle arises with regard to the U.S.: Why does the U.S. government 
favor a restriction of the Fund’s activities (contrary to Germany), given the fact that the 
IMF fulfills U.S. strategic as well as economic goals? In order to answer this question it 
is promising to go beyond the examination of “interests” as an explanatory variable as 
Broz and Hawes do, and analyze “ideas” as a formative influence on governmental 
positions towards global governance. 
 
In addition to this specific puzzle for the U.S., the general puzzle of the paper is also 
accentuated with regard to the IMF: Why do governments diverge on strategy, when they 
agree on necessity? Since the 1990s several financial crises increased the necessity for a 
more efficient management of global financial markets by the IMF. This need is 
acknowledged by governments, but no substantial reform of the IMF has been achieved 
due to diverging positions among key players, even among G7 countries, such as 
Germany and the U.S. The following examination will show that - regardless of the 
potential economic benefits of more efficient governance and material considerations - 
the positions diverge because they are shaped by diverging ideas on how to steer the 
economy prevailing in the two countries. Special interests and distributive questions were 
only affected in a diffuse way and material interests of domestic groups could not be 
detected in governmental positions. The dominance of ideas can be evidenced in the most 
important issue areas of IMF reform with regard to both the decision-making process of 
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the Fund and the Fund’s strategic policy contents. First, the independent variable “ideas” 
introduced in the previous section shall be specified with some empirical examples for 
the two countries under scrutiny here as follows:2 
 
With regard to ideas on the contents of policy, the tendency is that Americans emphasize 
the role of the market and of individual responsibility, while Germans tend to emphasize 
the role of the state and public solidarity. Also, in the U.S. “solidarity” is seen less as a 
governmental stronghold (as it is seen in Germany), and more as the realm of private 
charity. On the role of the state, figures from Heien (2002: 113-114) show that the state is 
held responsible for the provision of healthcare by 67.8% and for the living standard of 
the elderly by 73.6% of Americans, but by 92% of Germans in both fields. Also, more 
Germans agree than disagree with the statement that the state is responsible for the 
reduction of income inequalities (net figure: +22.5%) while more Americans disagree 
than agree with that as a state responsibility (net figure: -6.6%). Data from WVS (2004: 
V 142) on the role of private responsibility for the economy show that 26% of Americans 
favor more private ownership of business as compared to only 14% of Germans. The 
gradual and not fundamental differences expressed in these figures are reflected in the 
economic systems of the two countries. Both are market economies, but while the U.S. is 
seen as a liberal economy, Germany is considered as a social market economy (see next 
paragraph). 
 
With regard to ideas on the political process, the basic tendency is that Americans accept 
majoritarian decisions and the-winner-takes-it-all situations more than Germans, who 
emphasize consensual decision making and the inclusion of all relevant actors. This 
difference is also gradual and not fundamental in nature, as both countries are pluralistic 
democracies and share both ideas – however, not to the same degree. Empirical evidence 
on diverging process ideas with regard to the market as a process driven predominantly 
by either private actors or the government can also be found in figures from the WVS 
(2004: V144, V 157): While 30% of Americans support the statement that competition is 
                                                 
2 In order to give evidence for path-dependent “ideas”, public opinion polls will only be used if they refer to 
fundamental value-based expectations on the role of the government, individuals, and the market and not if 
they refer to situative opinions on specific present-day policy questions. 
  
 
14 
 
a force for good, only 16% of Germans agree to that statement. Diverging confidence in 
market forces is also expressed when 54% of Americans, but 36% of Germans show 
“confidence in major companies” (“a great deal/ quite a lot”). These different process 
ideas are expressed institutionally in form of the “coordinated” versus “liberal” character 
of the two economic systems according to Hall and Soskice (2001). The “coordinated” 
patterns in Germany and the “liberal” ones in the U.S. can be taken as evidence for the 
institutional anchoring of the ideas of “solidarity/ consensual decision making” in 
Germany and “individual responsibility/ competitive decision making” in the U.S. (also 
see Ganßmann 2003; Pauly/Reich 1997; Scharpf/Schmidt 2000; Schirm 2002b: 222-224; 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2001). In the following I will show that these gradual differences in the 
independent variable “ideas” are reflected in the dependent variable “preferences of 
governments” with regard to the ideas of “public solidarity/ individual responsibility”, 
“regulation of market/ trust in market”, and “inclusive decision-making/ leadership 
according to contributions”. The quotes were taken from the leading politicians from the 
national ministries responsible for dealing with the IMF, that is, the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury and the German Ministry of Finance. 
 
Decision-making  
The IMF is governed by its members, whose power rests on their respective voting 
quotas. With 17% of the votes, the United States has the largest quota and a veto power 
because fundamental decisions have to be approved by 85 % of all votes. Japan and 
Germany posess the second largest voting quotas and the OECD countries together own 
more than 50% of the votes. The distribution of voting quotas today does not reflect the 
rise of emerging markets in the last 20 years and is therefore often criticized because it 
endangers the acceptability and therefore the legitimacy and efficiency of the Fund. Many 
developing and newly industrializing countries and also some industrialized countries - 
such as Germany and the U.S. - are underrepresented when comparing their voting quotas 
in the IMF and their share in world-GNP. A very modest increase of the quotas of four 
emerging markets (Turkey, South Korea, Mexico, China) was agreed upon in 2006. No 
substantial reform was achieved because of divergent preferences of key players.  
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Germany and the United States differed fundamentally with regard to quota reform. 
Germany advocated an increase in voting shares of developing and newly industrializing 
counties (NICs) and was willing to give up a share of the voting power of industrialized 
countries - including its own - in order to change the distribution of power within the 
decision-making process of the IMF. In contrast, the United States wanted to increase the 
voting shares of some NICs and developing countries without reducing its own voting 
share and thus endangering its veto power. The U.S.’s only concession was that it was 
willing to forgo an increase of its quota. The reasons for these diverging positions given 
by the responsible policy makers clearly reflect the different ideas prevailing in the two 
societies on how to organize policy processes: While the U.S. stressed leadership, the 
shareholder character of the IMF and the link between contributions to the fund and 
voting shares, German policy makers emphasized consensual decision making by 
underlining the “equality” of all participating countries regardless of financial 
contributions: 
 
• U.S.: Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001) stressed the necessity of a “strong 
United States leadership in the IMF.” 
• U.S.: “The IMF is a shareholder institution” (John W. Snow, Statement by the US 
Treasury Secretary 2005). 
• U.S.: “The United States is not seeking to increase its own quota share and will not 
accept any decline” (Timothy D. Adams, Undersecretary for International Affairs, 
US Department of the Treasury, 2005). 
• U.S.: “We repeat our commitment to forgo the additional quota we would receive 
in the second stage increase beyond what we need to maintain our pre-Singapore 
voting share” (Henry M. Paulson, Statement by the U.S. Treasury Secretary 2007b). 
• Germany: Chancellor Schröder (2002) wrote: “After all, we need a truly democratic 
trade and financial regime in the world”. By emphasizing an equality of rights 
following the UN-pattern of ‘one country, one vote’, Schröder’s statement can be 
interpreted as a reflection of the process idea of consensual decision making in 
Germany. 
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• Germany: “Considerations should also be given to the role the quota formula 
should play in ensuring cohesiveness and equity between the Fund’s members. It 
should support a balanced distribution of quotas amongst all Fund members” 
(Federal Minister of Finance Peer Steinbrück 2007b). 
• Germany: “Germany supports efforts to strengthen voice and representation of 
developing countries” (Federal Minister of Finance Hans Eichel 2004) 
• Germany: “The quota and voting shares of the newly industrializing countries and 
of the developing countries shall be increased and the shares of the industrialized 
countries shall be reduced correspondingly“ (Bundesfinanzministerium (BMF) 
2007)  
 
Policy  
The International Monetary Fund was originally created in order to oversee exchange 
rates and grew into an organization which helped countries with balance of payments 
problems with short-term stand-by lending. The conditions attached to this lending aimed 
at improving the balance of payments situation of the borrower. The IMF’s role and 
financial involvement increased over the last 25 years especially with the respective 
crises in Latin America (1980s) and Asia (1997/98). The debate on a reform of the 
Fund’s policy essentially centers on whether it should focus on a surveillance of 
exchange rates and markets or whether it should be more involved in lending and 
regulation. The basic difference between German and U.S. positions refers to whether 
market forces should be trusted or embedded by the IMF and to whether the IMF should 
have a stronger or weaker role in governing the market and lending. Two quotes give 
evidence for the general difference in policy direction “trust in market forces” versus 
“regulation of markets”: 
• U.S.: “For the IMF, we will seek to refocus it on its core mission: international 
financial stability. This means strengthening the IMF’s ability to monitor the 
financial system to prevent crises before they happen. If crises occur, the IMF’s 
response must reinforce each countries’ responsibility for its own economic 
choices. A refocused IMF will strengthen market institutions and market discipline 
over financial decisions, helping to promote a stable and prosperous global 
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economy. By doing so, over time markets and the private sector can supplant the 
need for the IMF to perform in its current role” (The White House: National 
Security Strategy 2006: 30). 
• Germany: “More than ever we need cooperation with other states and international 
institutions in order to promote international financial markets in those regards in 
which they offer opportunities for growth, wealth and employment, but also in 
order to prevent uncalculable risks and economically damaging erroneous 
developments through effective surveillance and regulation [of financial markets]“ 
(Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück 2007a). 
 
More specifically, the two countries differed with regard to whether the IMF should (1) 
be in charge of a surveillance of exchange rates or also of financial markets more 
gernerally; (2) stick to surveillance or engage in larger lending; (3) consider poverty 
reduction as part of its policy: 
 
(1) Surveillance: exchange rates/ financial sector. The contentious issue with regard to 
surveillance is whether the Fund should focus on its core function of securing the stability 
of exchange rates and balance of payments through surveillance of exchange rates 
favored by the U.S. or whether it should expand its surveillance to the financial sector in 
general. The latter is supported by Germany and would increase the Fund’s influence not 
only on the international dimension of financial markets, but also allow it to rule into 
domestic regulation of markets: 
 
• U.S.: “Exercising firm surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies is the 
core function of the institution. (…) This should enable firmer surveillance in areas 
where market forces are not the prevailing paradigm” (Henry M. Paulson, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary 2007) 
• Germany: “Surveillance is the most important task of the Fund (…). We appreciate 
the efforts by the fund to strengthen the operational and analytical foundations of 
the surveillance of exchange rate policies. (…) We welcome the (…) step towards 
integrating macroeconomic and financial market analysis in multilateral 
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surveillance and towards focussing bilateral surveillance on financial sector issues” 
(Federal Minister of Finance Peer Steinbrück 2006). 
• Germany: “It is particularly important that the Fund should bring its coverage of 
financial sector and capital market developments, including at the global level, to 
the same level as its other core areas of expertise in surveillance” (Federal Minister 
of Finance Peer Steinbrück 2007). 
 
(2) Lending: reduction of lending/ expansion of lending. The U.S. government opposes 
lending by the IMF because it fears “moral hazard” and trusts market forces. Thus, the 
U.S. favors a restriction of IMF lending activities and a focus on securing stability 
through surveillance. In contrast, Germany considers lending a core task of the IMF also 
with regard to a recipient country’s domestic economic policy: 
 
• U.S.: “Rather than responding to global developments by expanding its mandate 
and making its efforts more diffuse, we believe the IMF needs to adapt and refine 
its core mission of promoting international financial stability and balance of 
payments adjustment” (John W. Snow, Statement by the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
2005). 
• U.S.: “However, the responses of the international community to crises in the 1990s 
continued roughly the same fashion as the response to Mexico (…) They tended to 
be government-focused rather than market-focused, emphasizing large loans by the 
official sector and later government induced bail-ins by the private sector. Many 
observers became concerned that the increasing use of very large financial 
packages and the bail-ins were having adverse effects on expectations or 
incentives” (John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury 2004).  
• Germany: “In case of balance of payments difficulties the IMF can emburse credits 
and loans to its member countries in order to support their economic adjustment 
and reform policies. In this regard, the IMF will focus increasingly on considering 
the social effects of its measures and on poverty reduction“ 
(Bundesregierung/Bundestag, Declaration of the Federal Government to Parlament 
2004: 19). 
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(3) Poverty Reduction: not IMF task/ IMF task. With regard to poverty reduction, the 
U.S. clearly opposes international “solidarity” through financial aid by the IMF, while 
Germany clearly wants the IMF to continue and to expand its poverty reduction activities: 
 
• U.S.: “(…) the IMF is not a development agency, and we strongly concur (…) that 
the IMF’s financing role in low-income countries should focus on actual balance of 
payments needs as it does in emerging market members” (Henry M. Paulson, 
Statement by the US Treasury Secretary April 14, 2007) 
• U.S.: “The IMF has an important role to play in low-income countries, providing 
policy advice and technical assistance in its core areas of expertise, and balance of 
payments financing, when needed. We welcome the IMF’s efforts to re-focus its 
engagement with low-income countries (…), but caution against the IMF’s over-
reaching on longer-term development issues better suited to the multilateral 
development banks” (Henry M. Paulson, Statement by the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
October 20, 2007) 
• Germany: “We support the introduction of a new shocks window within the PRGF 
[Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility] and of the Policy Support Instrument for 
low-income countries. Furthermore, Germany will contribute to the subsidization of 
the Fund’s Emergency Assistance for Natural Disasters” (Federal Minister of 
Finance Hans Eichel 2005). 
• Germany: “PRGF arrangements remain the core instrument of the Fund to 
contribute to poverty alleviation (…). Germany supports a financially augmented 
self-sustained PRGF” (Federal Minister of Finance Hans Eichel 2004) 
 
Result 
In sum, the preference of the U.S. government emphasizes different influence for those 
countries which fund the IMF and those who receive financial support by the IMF on the 
Fund’s decision-making. With regard to policy, the U.S. underlines individual 
responsibility as well as trust in market forces and the goal of reducing IMF programs to 
emergency aid. The German position shows less trust in market forces than the U.S. 
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position, wants international solidarity through an expansion of IMF programs on poverty 
reduction, and favors a strengthening of the developing countries in the decision-making 
of the Fund. Ideas as an independent variable allow a plausible interpretation of the 
diverging positions of the two governments. The preferences diverge along different 
content and process ideas with regard to “public solidarity/ individual responsibility”, 
“regulation of market/ trust in market”, and “inclusive decision-making/ leadership 
according to contributions”. The differences between the governmental preferences could 
not be overcome. No substantial reform of the IMF was achieved. 
  
Domestic Interests and Governmental Preferences: The Basel II Accord 
Unlike the IMF, which aims at governmental policy making and only indirectly affects 
private companies, Basel II directly governs private business by setting standards for 
lending and borrowing and therefore by influencing competitiveness and costs of firms. 
The multilateral negotiations between governments on the Basel II Accord in the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision intend to reform the standards which banks must 
follow when lending capital. The goal is to systematically link the risk of lending to the 
reserve requirements for banks – the riskier the loan, the higher the reserves - in order to 
avoid problems for banks and financial market crises.  
 
While Basel I determined reserve requirements according the type of borrower, Basel II 
makes reserve requirements dependent on the individual creditworthiness of the 
borrower. The negotiations were conducted on the German side by the Bundesbank, the 
Federal Surveillance Office for Banks (BaFin) and on the U.S. side by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve System. Thus, unlike the 
IMF case the German Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Department of the Treasury did 
not participate directly in the negotiations, but oversaw and/ or controlled the negotiating 
governmental agencies mentioned above. In the two countries, the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers is traditionally undertaken in different ways following 
distinct national standards and procedures. A first look at the governmental positions 
shows that neither government recurs to “ideas” in their statements. Instead, the positions 
reflect the material interests, the costs and benefits of the economic sectors affected, 
  
 
21 
 
especially those of the banking community. Therefore, this case study seems well suited 
for an illustration of the influence of material interests articulated by lobbying groups. 
The lobbying activities of individual banks (such as Mellon and State Street) as well as 
bank and industry associations (such as the American Bankers Association and 
Bankenverband) have been widely reported in the media (see e.g. The Economist, March 
29, 2003: 65-66; Financial Times October 19, 2002: 12 and June 17, 2003: 31 and June 
19, 2003: 11 and October 15: 15; Financial Times Deutschland April 4, 2001: 20 and 
April 2, 2002: 32 and October 31, 2003: 1 and November 14, 2003: 22). The following 
quotes evidence both the demands of lobbying groups and the governmental positions on 
the Basel II issues. In order to reach a high representativity of the independent variable 
“interests”, only documents from associations representing the involved sectors such as 
the American Bankers Association, the Bundesverband Deutscher Banken and the 
Association of German Industry (and no positions of individual companies) were 
considered: 
 
 (1) Affected Banks. In the United States several lobbying groups pressured the 
government to apply the new Basel II rules only to large, internationally active banks. 
The U.S. government acceded to these demands. The question on which banks must 
implement Basel II was not a lobby issue in Germany (and the EU) because special 
standards were set for small and large banks, while all banks had to implement Basel II: 
 
• U.S. Interest Group: “We support the concept that the New Accord should only be 
applied to the largest internationally active banks and others that elect to adopt its 
requirements. The complex standard is not appropriate to most small community 
banks.” (American Bankers Association 2003). 
• U.S. Interest Group: “The original Basel Accord was developed (…) to provide a 
uniform international regulatory standard specifically for large, internationally 
active banks. The agencies, however, elected to apply it to every bank in the 
country. The generic model has never been a good fit for the wide variety of 
individual circumstances of American banks, particularly the smaller institutions” 
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(Harris H. Simmons, Testimony on Behalf of the American Bankers Association 
(ABA) 2006). 
• U.S. Government: “Maintaining an appropriate competitive balance in the U.S. 
between our large, internationally active banks, on the one hand, and the thousands 
of smaller banks and thrift institutions, on the other hand, is the crucial 
consideration” (John Hawke, Testimony of the Comptroller of the Currency 2003, 
p. 3) 
• U.S. Government: “As noted, we anticipate that only one or two dozen institutions 
would move to the U.S. version of Basel II in the near term, meaning that the vast 
majority of U.S. institutions would continue to operate under Basel I-based rules” 
(Blies, Susan Schmidt, Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2006). 
 
(2) Form of Rating. U.S. banks traditionally use external rating agencies such as Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor in order to assess the creditworthiness of (potential) borrowers and 
are accustomed to be rated themselves externally. In contrast, German banks traditionally 
use internal rating mechanisms for borrowers with whom they traditionally have a long-
term involvement as “Hausbank” of a company. Thus, the cost of adapting to the external 
rating planed in Basel II , was heavier for German banks than for U.S. banks: „German 
resistance against the exclusive use of external ratings is based on the argument that they 
would distort the level playing field“ (Kerwer 2004: 217; also see Wanner 2003: 22). 
German banks lobbied in order to maintain the option of internal rating and to ease the 
pressure of adaptation to external rating mechanisms. In the end, the negotiators agreed to 
include internal as well as external rating in the New Basel II Accord: 
 
• German Interest Group: “Furthermore, we consider the strong restriction of the 
applicability of the Internal Assessment Approach (IAA) (…) not practicable. (…) 
It would contradict the systematic of Basel II to force the banks to implement an 
IAA according to the procedures of a recognized external rating agency, when this 
bank practices an internal risk assessment system” (Zentraler Kreditausschuss der 
Deutschen Banken 2004) 
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• German Government: “The banks can estimate all four risk parameters themselves. 
The resulting risk assessment system internal to the banks has to be approved by the 
supervising agency BaFin“ (Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) 2006: 59). 
 
(3) Implementation Schedule. U.S. banks heavily lobbied policy makers to delay the 
implementaion of Basel II in the U.S. and to make the final implementation dependent on 
analyses and on first experiences of the effects the Basel II regulations would have on the 
competitiveness of U.S. banks. The success of this lobbying by U.S. special interest 
groups triggered opposition of German lobby groups who feared a distortion of 
international competition because German and EU banks had to fully implement Basel II 
regulations much before U.S. banks. German lobbying groups were also successful in 
shaping their government’s position on this issue: 
 
• U.S. Interest Group: “ICBA remains concerned about the competitive disparities 
between Basel I and Basel II and recommends that the implementation of Basel II 
(…) be delayed until the U.S. regulators have completed their analysis (…) and 
have come to a consensus concerning its competitive impact” (Independent 
Community Bankers of America (ICBA) 2005). 
• U.S. Government: “(…) the banking regulators announced a delay in the 
implementation of the phase-in period for Basel II, which will not begin until 2008, 
a year after European banks will begin implementing Basel II” (U.S. Department of 
Treasury 2006: Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance Randal K. 
Quarles). 
• German Interest Group: “(…) voices are heard from the U.S.A. that the American 
side might want to implement Basel II later. However, no time should be lost in 
accomplishing the project also in its planed international scale” (Manfred Weber, 
declaration of the executive director of the Federal Association of German Banks, 
in: Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken 2005). 
• German Government: “(…) I observe with great concern that Basel II is 
implemented within the European Union, but at the same time one is starting to 
hesitate in the last second on the other side of the Atlantic. That was not the 
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intention of Basel II. Therefore, we have to talk about this with the American 
partners once more” (Chancellor Angela Merkel 2006). 
 
(4) Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs). Special treatment for Small and Medium 
Size Enterprises (SMEs) was an important issue for German lobby groups because SMEs 
form a large group of the German Industry Association’s (BDI) members and are 
considered to be the “backbone” of the German economy. Heavy lobbying made the 
government negotiate special rating and lending conditions for SMEs in the Basel II 
Accord. SME demands were not an issue for US lobby groups on Basel II: 
 
• German Interest Group: “(…) the proposed directive put forward by the EU 
Commission for the implementation of Basel II needs to be redesigned to cater 
better for the need of the SMEs. The objective must be that the markedly lower risk 
ballast for the small and medium sized enterprises (…) are given full consideration” 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) 2004) 
• German Government: “The Federal Government has taken care that EU directives 
are implemented in a favorable way for medium-size firms. In this regard, we 
accomplished an agreement on medium-size-firms in the international negotiations 
on Basel II” (Bundesregierung 2006)  
• German Government: „(…) the medium size [enterprises] component which was 
carried through in the negotiations by Germany (…) benefits private individuals 
and SMEs” (Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) 2006: 59) 
 
Result  
The diverging preferences of both governments clearly reflect the different interests of 
those sectors directly affected by the new governance initiative. Bank and industry 
associations in both countries lobbied and apparently induced the respective governments 
to follow their positions. In the end, the Basel II negotiations reached a compromise on 
which both sides could agree: the use of external rating was complemented with 
possibilities of internal rating and the additional costs for long-term lending (traditionally 
stronger for German SMEs than in the U.S.) were moderated to a level acceptable to the 
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German side. The delay in implementation of Basel II in the U.S. and the kind of banks 
affected by Basel II in the U.S. are still under discussion. In sum, the core distributional 
conflicts were gradually solved in the negotiations by mutually acceptable partitions of 
the costs of adjustment to new governance rules. Even though some issues are still 
contested, negotiators have agreed on most elements of Basel II and therefore 
successfully created more efficient global financial governance. With regard to the two 
countries examined here, compromises were reached which took into consideration the 
interests of German and U.S. banks as well as the interests of all (banks and 
governments) in an increased stability of financial markets through new rules of global 
governance. 
 
Conclusion 
Why do governmental preferences towards global financial governance diverge despite a 
shared perception of the need for a better management of globalizing financial markets? 
The explanatory approach outlined in this paper and the brief empirical exemplification 
of the hypotheses showed that the foreign economic policy preferences of governments 
were decisively shaped by domestic ideas or interests, which led to cross-country 
divergence. The plausibility of this result is based on the incorporation of material 
interests as well as societal ideas into the analysis. An exclusive consideration of one of 
these two variables would have allowed only for a partial explanation of national 
divergence. It was possible to show theoretically and empirically that the incorporation of 
both variables increases the cognitive value of the analysis of international political 
economy. 
 
Why do governments agree on a reform of global governance in some cases, but not in 
others? The case studies supported the hypothesis that new governance succeeds more 
easily when differing interests come to bear than when diverging ideas meet. Differences 
in material interests were accessible to compromising through a partition of costs and 
benefits of new governance. On the other hand, divergence of ideas with regard to 
questions on the core tasks of politics towards markets (contents ideas) and on the 
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methods of political decision making (process ideas) were not as amenable to 
compromise. This second puzzle on the conditions for compromise confirmed the 
necessity of considering both variables in the analysis.  
 
When do ideas prevail over interests and when interests over ideas? An important field 
for future research on the influence of endogenous factors on governmental preferences 
on global economic governance concerns hypothesis 3 regarding the examination of the 
reasons for the specific role of ideas versus interests. The conditions must be theoretically 
and empirically further analyzed under which ideas prevail over interests or vice versa in 
foreign economic policy. The results of the case studies presented here, however, provide 
evidence for a preliminary answer: 
 
First, an important condition seems to be the intensity to which interests are affected and 
with which they are articulated vis-à-vis the government by lobbying groups. Domestic 
interests formed the dominant influence on governmental positions in the case in which 
organized interest groups were affected directly through changes in costs by the planned 
global governance rules and in which they were actively lobbying the government. On 
the other hand, ideas prevailed in influencing governmental preferences in the case in 
which no interest group was affected directly by costs and in which fundamental 
questions of the role of politics in governing the economy were debated. Thus, neither the 
German nor the U.S. position towards the Basel II negotiations were dominated by ideas, 
but both strongly reflected the interests of affected and active lobby groups. On the other 
hand, both governments’ positions on the reform of the IMF clearly mirrored endogenous 
content and process ideas while no affected and active lobbying groups were observed. 
Apparently, the global public bad of a suboptimal management of financial crises by the 
IMF did not privilege or underprivileged specific interest groups to the degree necessary 
to mobilize intensive lobbying on a new strategy for the IMF. Thus, with regard to 
intensity, interests prevailed over ideas when special interests are strongly affected 
directly, while ideas prevailed when interests were affected only in a diffuse way.  
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Second, another condition decisive for the question on the prevalence of either ideas or 
interests is the policy issue at stake: does the global governance initiative concern 
fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the economy, or does it 
concern the distribution of costs and benefits in specific areas? Evidence from the case 
studies support the claim that ideas bear the dominant influence on governmental 
preferences, when fundamental political questions are at stake, as happened with regard 
to a reform of the IMF. Here, the issues under scrutiny revolved around the role of the 
state and the market in governing the economy as well as the form of participation in 
decision making and thus about the contents as well as the process of policy. These issues 
apparently strengthened the influence of ideas on the preferences of the two governments. 
The other case study supports this explanation, because the issues at stake at the Basel II 
negotiations refered to specific material and distributive questions on banking standards, 
which apparently triggered strong activities by affected lobbying groups, which sought to 
promote their interests as key variables in the formation of governmental preferences. 
Thus, interests prevailed over ideas when distributive questions dominated, while ideas 
prevailed over interests when fundamental questions about the role of politics in 
governing the economy dominated the governance debate.  
 
The separation of ideas and interests in this paper was of course undertaken for the 
purpose of analytical clarity. Human action and governmental preferences will often 
include elements of both driving forces. However, which of these two variables prevails 
in a given area does make a difference not only to analysis but also to governmental 
preference formation and to the future of global governance. All conclusions of this paper 
must remain preliminary in nature due to the small number of cases and to the short 
empirical exemplification of the hypotheses. The core result is that a comprehensive 
explanation of the preferences of governments and of their ability to compromise on 
global financial governance only becomes possible when the analysis goes beyond 
international institutions and regimes and includes domestic ideas and interests as major 
driving forces.  
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